Alan Dransfield's Blog

Email sent – Sun 02/06/2019 09:19

Ms Elizabeth Denham
Information Commissioner

Dear Madam

The Vale View school in Stockport was built on top of an
active landfill site in 2006 which is still gassing to date. There is breaking
news from the Buchanan school in Scotland that contaminated drinking water
has/will cause cancer in teachers and students because that school was built on top of a landfill Site.

If you check you ICO records you will see that Mrs Sheila
Oliver submitted a FOIA request to Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council (SMBC) for
technical data at the school but the SMBC refused under section 14/1 vexatious
and the ICO upheld that vexatious decision.

There is no doubt in my mind the ICO have got blood on their
hands from this Stockport Vale View school. Ditto for the 6 Exeter PFI schools.
Sheila Oliver is a relentless FOIA Campaigner and the ICO has failed its fiduciary duty of care to assist her with the FOIA.

In your defence these appalling breaches of Section 77
happened before you took up your post. Neverhless, you have acted in a
similar cavalier manner. Basically, the ICO is aiding and abetting
serious fraud, misfeasance and abuse of power.

With thanks

Yours sincerely

Alan M Dransfield

To compound matters further, the ICO Senior Manager Mr Alex
Goantis who also held a senior full time Managers Role at the ICO failed
to see such problems.

https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/teachers-develop-rare-cancer-after-16206823

In Stocker v Stocker (SvS) dated 3rd April 2019 v the
Supreme Court (SC) concluded, inter alia, that lower court judges unlawfully
fettered their reasoning when relying on an external definition, absent
context, upon which their judgement turned, especially when the contentious
issue was proven to be true.

Using the same rationale put by the SC in S v S, it must
follow that the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court misdirected itself and erred
in law when deciding Dransfield (2015 EWCA /454 Civ because
not only can ‘vexatious’ not be defined contextually as ‘manifestly
unreasonable’, but it has been subsequently proved that the issue of
vexatiousness never existed in the first place, within Dransfield,
and also that disclosure of the information sought was proved not to be
manifestly unreasonable.

Therefore, both logic and justice dictate that the SC
voluntarily revisit Dransfield and strike out all lower court
decisions blocking Dransfield’s access to information that has now been
freely placed in the public domain on the grounds that publication is justified
not least on grounds of health and safety, as originally stated by
Dransfield in his FoIA request.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/659606/FOI_Code_of_Practice_-_Draft.pdf

https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/decision-notices/2017/2013939/fs50610253.pdf

“83. The term “vexatious” is not defined in the FOIA. The Upper Tribunal (UT) considered the issue of vexatious requests in the Information Commissioner v Devon CC & Dransfield (UKUT 440 (AAC), 28 January 2013).1 The UT commented that “vexatious” could be defined as the “manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of a formal procedure”. This definition clearly establishes that the concepts of proportionality and justification are relevant to any consideration of whether a request is vexatious.”

http://www.blogtalkradio.com/freedomtalkradioonlinepodcast/2019/01/25/alan-m-dransfield-freedom-of-information-show-p2