In Stocker v Stocker (SvS) dated 3rd April 2019 v the
Supreme Court (SC) concluded, inter alia, that lower court judges unlawfully
fettered their reasoning when relying on an external definition, absent
context, upon which their judgement turned, especially when the contentious
issue was proven to be true.

Using the same rationale put by the SC in S v S, it must
follow that the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court misdirected itself and erred
in law when deciding Dransfield (2015 EWCA /454 Civ because
not only can ‘vexatious’ not be defined contextually as ‘manifestly
unreasonable’, but it has been subsequently proved that the issue of
vexatiousness never existed in the first place, within Dransfield,
and also that disclosure of the information sought was proved not to be
manifestly unreasonable.

Therefore, both logic and justice dictate that the SC
voluntarily revisit Dransfield and strike out all lower court
decisions blocking Dransfield’s access to information that has now been
freely placed in the public domain on the grounds that publication is justified
not least on grounds of health and safety, as originally stated by
Dransfield in his FoIA request.